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"THE MOST EXTRAORDINARILY POWERFUL COURT OF LAW
THE WORLD HAS EVER KNOWN"?-JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
PETER
I.

E.

QuINT*

INTRODUCTION

The great teacher and scholar Alexander Bickel begins his classic
study of the Supreme Court with a sentence that is at once resounding
and paradoxical. According to Bickel, "[t]he least dangerous branch
of the American government is the most extraordinarily powerful
court of law the world has ever known."' The force of this pronouncement lay in Bickel's ironic reference to Alexander Hamilton's viewin The FederalistPapers-thatthe judiciary was the "least dangerous" of
the branches.2 Certainly, in 1962 when Bickel wrote, the status of the
American Supreme Court as the world's "most extraordinarily powerful" tribunal was hardly in doubt.
But since Bickel published these lines more than forty years ago,
new constitutional courts-performing broad functions of reviewhave been established in many countries of the world. Particularly
after 1990, new democracies arising from the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and its dependent states have enthusiastically established constitutional courts with wide powers. Constitutional courts in Hungary,
Poland, and Russia, for example, have attracted particular attention
for the sweep and importance of their judgments. After the end of
apartheid, South Africa has also relied on a new constitutional courtfirst to approve, and then to interpret, its recently adopted constitutional document.
Moreover, those constitutional tribunals that were already in existence when Bickel wrote have since greatly extended the range and
scope of their jurisprudence. For example, the French Conseil constitutionnel, although still limited to abstract review of statutes before promulgation, has developed far beyond its original function as a
* Jacob A. France Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Maryland School of
Law.
Earlier versions of this Essay were presented at Marbuiy 2003, a symposium sponsored
by Johns Hopkins University, the University of Maryland, and the University of Baltimore,
Baltimore, Maryland, February 2003; and at the Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, India,
December 2004.
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1 (1962).

2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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protection for the French President against incursions by the Parliament. Instead, the French tribunal has now become an important
guarantor of individual rights as well. The Israeli Supreme Court has
also greatly expanded its power of constitutional review, and the Supreme Court of India has attracted wide attention, particularly for its
enforcement of affirmative action, social welfare, and environmental
provisions in the Indian Constitution.
Quite possibly the most influential of these twentieth century
tribunals is the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany, created after World War II for the purpose of enforcing the
1949 West German Constitution, the Basic Law. When this fledgling
institution opened its doors in 1951, few could have had high hopes
for such a tribunal in a country which, notwithstanding centuries of
formidable legal development, had little experience with a judicial organ that was authorized to overrule the decisions of the legislative and
executive branches.
Moreover, of course, the immediate background of the Basic Law
and the Constitutional Court was the baneful example of the dictatorial Nazi past. The new democratic institutions were designed to banish that past, but they also drew significantly on the example of the
Weimar Constitution of 1919, whose weaknesses may have paved the
way for the coming of the Nazi regime. Indeed, the German Basic
Law of 1949 could be viewed as an attempt to adopt something like
the Weimar Constitution-purged of the infirmities of the earlier
document.
But notwithstanding modest expectations at the outset, the German Constitutional Court has created a complex and impressive jurisprudence over the decades, and it has developed a deepening
confidence and authority. In numerous instances, the Court has had
little reluctance to review the decisions of other branches and to draw
on the country's rich legal traditions to create a new judicial institution of formidable competence and power. Indeed, in light of the
scope of itsjudgments and the sweep of itsjurisdiction, the contemporary observer might well ask whether the German Constitutional
Court has surpassed the American Supreme Court-as well as other
possible contenders-to become "the most extraordinarily powerful
court of law the world has ever known."
II.

CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

When the West German Basic Law was adopted in 1949, it contained specific provisions creating the Constitutional Court and outlining its powers-including exclusive authority to invalidate statutes
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of Parliament. There was thus absolutely no question as to the framers' intention to create a tribunal that would exercise the function of
judicial review.'
Of course, this explicit adoption ofjudicial review in the constitution contrasts sharply with the origins of that institution in the United
States. The American constitutional text does not explicitly provide
for judicial review, although authorization for the institution may be
teased out of language in Article III and Article VI, as eminent commentators have argued over the years.4 A view from the historical perspective indicates that some of the American constitutional Framers of
1787-1789 certainly anticipated that this power would be exercised,
whereas others would most likely have sharply rejected any such possibility. In the great case of Marbury v. Madison, the institution of judicial review was inferred by Chief Justice John Marshall-although not
primarily from the constitutional text itself, but from what Marshall
considered to be the nature of a written constitution as well as the
ordinary functions of courts.5 Other early judges and legislators drew
similar conclusions.
This sharp difference in the origin of judicial review in the German and in the American constitutional systems has contributed-in
some cases clearly, in other cases more speculatively-to a number of
differences between the systems.
It may be worthwhile to comment briefly on some of these important contrasts.
III.

JURISDICTION OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The first difference arises from the fact that under the American
Constitution the Supreme Court of the United States is, in important
respects, just another court. It is supreme over all other American
courts: the "inferior" federal courts authorized to be created by Congress in Article III as well as the state courts-as we know from Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee,6 decided in 1816. But, in the nature of its basic functions, the Supreme Court does not differ much from any other court.
Indeed, Marshall in Marbuy derives the institution of judicial review

3. GG arts. 92-94, 100.
4. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1,
2-5 (1959); RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 198-284 (1969).
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958).

5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
6. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

But see
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from the general nature of courts-and not from any particular qualities of the Supreme Court itself.7
As a result, Marbury implies that the institution of judicial review

arises from the function of courts in ordinary cases-ordinary lawsuits
of the garden variety-in which it happens that, because of some aspect of the parties or the claims, a constitutional provision must be
employed as one of the relevant sources of law. Marbury therefore can
be read to suggest that the federal courts have no authority to exercise
judicial review outside of the scope of an ordinary lawsuit-outside,
that is, of the scope of the famous "cases" or "controversies" referred
to in Article III.' This way of looking at Marbury has lent support to
the doctrines of "standing" and 'Justiciability" which-although they
may have been to some extent diluted in recent decades-still substantially limit the institution of American judicial review.
In contrast, the Constitutional Court of Germany was not created
as an "ordinary court"-but was established for the specific purpose of

enforcing the constitution. Indeed, in a number of crucial ways, it is
clearly set apart from the "ordinary" court system. As a result, there is
not always the same focus on the imperatives of the ordinary lawsuit
and the ordinary "case" or "controversy" in the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court.
In fact, the German Basic Law expressly sets forth forms of jurisdiction-to be exercised by the Constitutional Court-that lie well
outside the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States.
These forms of extended judicial authority are in addition to the Constitutional Complaint, a form of petition that allows disputes resembling the American "cases" and "controversies" to come before the

Constitutional Court.
A.

Abstract Norm Control

For example, the German Basic Law permits one-third of the
members of the Bundestag, the popular House of Parliament, to file an
action directly in the Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of a statute.9 In effect, this provision allows a losing parlia-

mentary minority-if sufficiently strong and sufficiently enraged-to
proceed directly to the Constitutional Court after a statute is enacted.
7. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177: "If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them
to give it effect?" (emphasis added). See generally id. at 177-80.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
9. GG art. 93, § 1 cl. 2. A State (Land) of the Federal Republic may also file such a
petition.
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In contrast, the attempt to create so-called "congressperson standing"-which might bear a rough analogy to this German counterpart-has not been countenanced by the American Supreme Court.1"
Indeed, the striking breadth of this so-called "Abstract Norm Control"
in Germany-and its frequent use as a political tool-have sometimes
evoked calls for its abolition. Notwithstanding these doubts, however,
this jurisdiction seems unlikely to be repealed.
On some occasions, the Abstract Norm Control grants jurisdiction under circumstances in which a traditional litigant-in the
American sense-might be difficult to find or even to imagine. In
1974, for example, when the Social Democratic coalition relaxed
criminal penalties on abortion, the losing minority of conservative
members of Parliament (making up considerably more than one-third
of the Bundestag) successfully petitioned the Constitutional Court to
have the statute declared unconstitutional-as falling short of the
state's constitutional obligation to protect the life of the fetus."1 In
this proceeding, it might be difficult to imagine an individual litigant
who presented a traditional "case" or "controversy" in the American
sense. Certainly the individual parties most immediately affected by
the statute-a pregnant woman seeking an abortion, as well as her physician-would not challenge the liberalization of the provisions; and
the fetus itself does not ordinarily have legal capacity in American (or,
12
for that matter, in German) law.
B.

Organstreit

Another specific provision of the Basic Law allows one organ of
the federal government to sue another organ-directly in the Consti13
tutional Court-to contest any claimed infringement of its authority.
This explicit grant of jurisdiction should be compared with the result
in the American case of Goldwater v. Carter,14 decided in 1979. In this
case, the Supreme Court (in a split decision) declined to rule on the
merits when Senators and Representatives sued President Carter, ar10. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
11. 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975). A number of German States were also petitioners in this
action.
12. In other legislation of the same era, the Social Democratic coalition made it easier
for an army inductee to claim status as a conscientious objector. In response, the conservative minority in Parliament filed an Abstract Norm Control proceeding, and the Constitutional Court declared the statute unconstitutional. 48 BVerfGE 127 (1978). As in the
abortion case, a statute that provides a benefit to those directly affected-instead of imposing a burden-might not yield a traditional litigant in the American sense.
13. GG art. 93, § 1 cl. 1. This form ofjurisdiction is known as "Organstreit," or "dispute
between constitutional organs."
14. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
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guing that his unilateral termination of the Taiwan Mutual Defense
Treaty infringed the constitutional power of the Senate and the
House. 1 5 An analogous action, however, would almost certainly be
justiciable in the German Constitutional Court.
In an interesting example of this jurisdiction-which I will touch
upon further below-the parliamentary caucus (Fraktion) of the Social
Democrats was allowed to represent the interest of the legislature in
challenging the executive's decision to deploy German armed forces
6
beyond the claimed constitutional limit of the NATO zone.'
C.

Concrete Norm Control

Finally, there is one way in which the German Basic Law narrows
the constitutional jurisdiction of certain courts-although not of the
Constitutional Court itself. The German Basic Law makes clear that
the Constitutional Court is the only tribunal that can declare a statute
of Parliament unconstitutional. As a result, the constitution requires
that if any other court (for example, one of the ordinary civil or crimi-

nal courts) should find that a relevant statute is unconstitutional, that
court must suspend the proceeding immediately and refer the question of constitutionality to the Constitutional Court.' 7 Only after the
Constitutional Court has decided this issue, may the proceeding resume its ordinary course.
But, in the United States, Marbury v. Madison implies quite a different role for the lower courts. As noted, Marshall in Marbury infers
the power of judicial review from the nature of courts-not from the
particular nature of the Supreme Court. Indeed, there is nothing in
Marbury that limits the force of its reasoning on judicial review to the

Supreme Court alone. As a result, judicial review of federal statutes
can (and, indeed, must) be exercised by every American court-by
the lower federal courts, and by the state courts also, pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause. t"

In almost all cases, therefore, the Supreme Court will have the
benefit of extended discussion and holdings in the lower courts on
15. Four Justices found that the case presented a nonjusticiable "political" question.
Id at 1002-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). A fifth Justice found that the
case was "not ripe for judicial review." Id. at 997-1002 (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment).
16. 90 BVerfGE 286 (1994); see also, e.g., 104 BVerfGE 151 (2001) (NATO Strategic
Concept Case).
17. GG art. 100, § 1. This jurisdiction is known as "Concrete Norm Control" because,
unlike the Abstract Norm Control discussed above, it arises in the context of a concrete
case.
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Wechsler, supra note 4, at 3.
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the question that it is about to consider. Indeed, if the Supreme
Court chooses not to hear such a case, a lower federal court (or even a
state court) may have the last word-at least for the moment-on the
question of constitutionality.
In Germany, by contrast, the Constitutional Court stands alone in
determining the constitutionality of federal statutes-without much
assistance from debates in the lower judiciary on these questions.
Only the specific lower court that believes a statute to be unconstitutional must present its reasons in a "submission" (Vorlage) to the Constitutional Court in the case of the Concrete Norm Control.
In contrast, however, the other courts in the German judicial system are required to pass upon the constitutionality of governmental
actions other than statutes. In this respect, therefore, the two systems
are not so far apart.
IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

As our examination shows, therefore, the jurisdiction of the German Constitutional Court is significantly broader than that of the Supreme Court of the United States. But that is not all. The issues and
topics of adjudication examined by the German Court are also considerably more extensive than those that fall within the purview of its
American counterpart. To some extent, this difference results from
the broad coverage of the German Basic Law which, as a modern constitution, specifically addresses numerous issues that were unknown,
or at least considered less pressing, in the great periods of American
constitution-making of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But
the difference also arises from the German Court's greater willingness, in many areas, to extend its doctrine beyond limits that might be
suggested by a narrower view of the text. Suffice it to say that I believe
that the development of doctrine by the German Constitutional Court
displays a confidence and sovereign reach that-in some ways-goes
well beyond that of the Supreme Court of the United States.
I would like to offer a few brief examples of what I mean.
A.

Review of Economic Regulation

First, the German Constitutional Court is much more willing to
intervene in matters of economic regulation than the American Supreme Court has been since the New Deal revolution of the 1930s.
Indeed, the Constitutional Court reviews these issues as a routine matter-often employing concepts of equality as well as a substantive
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right to the choice of occupations arising from Article 12 of the German Basic Law.' 9
In the process of German unification, for example, the Constitutional Court acted almost as a form of mediator or ombudsman, evening out disparities and apparently seeking to reconcile groups that it
believed had been unduly harmed in the process. Employing ideas of
equality, the Court accordingly required that one group of former
property holders should not be completely excluded from the regime
of compensation; 20 and in another case, the Court required certain
measures of social welfare, in order to ease the burden on some of the
eastern public officials who lost their jobs when the inflated East German governmental system was merged with the West. 2 1 In a series of

decisions related to social welfare more generally, the Court has
found that the government is constitutionally required to exempt a
certain basic level of income-the "existence minimum" for the family
unit-from federal income taxation. 22 The Court has also been active
in enforcing constitutional doctrines that require certain transfer payments from the federal government and the more prosperous states,
in order to mitigate disparities experienced by states with lower per
capita incomes.2 3
The degree of detailed review exercised by the German Constitutional Court in economic matters is exemplified by a recent case in
which the Court declared the unconstitutionality of a rule requiring
lower regulated fees for certain eastern German lawyers in comparison with those in western Germany. 24 The Court acknowledged that
in 1990-upon German unification-it was constitutionally permissible for the Unification Treaty to set lower fees for East German lawyers, as a result of differing economic and legal circumstances in East
19. See generally David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 333. Currie concludes that the
Constitutional Court has become the "ultimate censor of the reasonableness of governmental action"-rather like the United States Supreme Court during the period of Lochner
v. New York. Id. at 336.
20. 84 BVerfGE 90 (1991).
21. 84 BVerfGE 133 (1991). For discussion of these cases, see PETER E. QUINT, THE
IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION 134-38, 168-71
(1997).
22. 82 BVerfGE 60 (1990); 99 BVerfGE 216 (1998); cf GG art. 20, § 1. For other cases
in which the German Constitutional Court has reviewed the levels or conditions of taxation, see, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANV
52-60 (1994).
23. CURRIE, supra note 22, at 80; Clifford Larsen, States Federal, Financial,Sovereign and
Social. A CriticalInquiry into an Alternative to American FinancialFederalism,47 Am.J. CoMp. L.
429 (1999).
24. 107 BVerfGE 133 (2003).
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But, the Court continued, intervening legal changes-

which have made it possible for eastern lawyers to secure western cli26
ents also-have removed the economic basis for this distinction.
Therefore in 2003-thirteen years after unification-this disparity of
regulated fees is no longer constitutionally permissible.
B. Affirmative Obligations on the Government
Secondly, the German Constitutional Court has not hesitated to
impose significant affirmative obligations on the government when it
finds that these are constitutionally required. In contrast, of course,
the American Supreme Court has found that the Constitution does
not impose affirmative obligations on the government-unless the state
has first itself violated individual rights, and affirmative acts by the gov27
ernment are required as a remedy.
In the area of education, for example, the German Constitutional
Court has sometimes required affirmative action by the government
to favor individuals. Under Article 7, Section 4 of the Basic Law, parents have the right to establish private schools, apart from the state
system. The Basic Law is silent about the funding of these private
schools. But the Constitutional Court has declared that the government must provide financial support to these schools, under certain
circumstances, in order to make the parents' individual rights a reality. 28 Moreover, the Constitutional Court has declared that the government may well have a constitutional obligation to maintain
university facilities to an extent necessary to accommodate an appro29
priate number of qualified applicants.
But, on the other hand, the German Constitutional Court has
also required the government to impose significant burdens on individuals as a constitutional matter. Here, again, the Court's first abortion
decision is an eminent example. In 1974, the Social Democratic government enacted a statute that decriminalized abortion in the first
three months of pregnancy. Acting upon the petition of conservative
members of Parliament, the Constitutional Court found that the guar25. Id. at 145.
26. Id. at 146-48.
27. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). This
fundamental position, most sharply expressed in the DeShaney opinion, distinguishes the
American Supreme Court from many other constitutional tribunals in the world today. See,
e.g., Gerhard Casper, Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism: 18th to 20th Century, 1989 Sup.
CT. REv. 311, 328.
28. 75 BVerfGE 40 (1987); see CURRIE, supra note 22, at 287-90.
29. 33 BVerfGE 303 (1972).

2006]

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY

161

that the
antees of life and human dignity in the Basic Law required
30
government reinstate criminal penalties for abortion.
Not only that-the Court in effect went on to draft its own criminal statute, setting forth what it thought was required as well as including a number of important exceptions to criminal liability mandated
by the countervailing personality rights of the pregnant woman.
Needless to say, the Court's "statute"-which remained in effect until
Parliament could act-was also the model for Parliament's own subsequent legislation. That the Court itself relaxed this holding to some
extent in 1993 does not detract from the sovereign quality of its approach in these cases. 3
C. Foreign Affairs
Finally, in foreign affairs, the German Constitutional Court has
also acted with great authority. When the German government

sought to join its NATO allies in military enforcement of UN Security
Council resolutions on Yugoslavia, German military participation was
challenged in the Constitutional Court.12 Opponents argued that the

Basic Law only allowed the deployment of German armed forces for
purposes of "defense."3 According to this view, the Basic Law might
permit German army actions within the NATO zone itself, but not
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which lay beyond that

zone.
In an opinion that was breathtaking in many ways, the Constitutional Court recast the doctrine respecting the use of German armed
forces.3 4 The Court found that the German military could constitutionally engage in hostilities outside of the NATO zone-so long as
the action remained within the framework of a "system of mutual col-

lective security," such as NATO or perhaps the United Nations. 5 Accordingly, the permissible scope of German army deployments was
expanded-but in a way that required concerted international action
30. 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975).
31. 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993). Indeed, in the 1993 Abortion Case, the Court again imposed its own "statute" which remained in effect until the Parliament could act. Id. at 20913; see also UwE WESEL, DER GANG NACH KAZLSRUHE 201 (2004) (noting that the Constitu-

tional Court in effect wrote a statute for a state legislature in a case on TV regulation).
32. 90 BVerfGE 286 (1994). As noted above, this was an Organstreitaction commenced
by legislators who argued that parliamentary rights were being infringed by unconstitutional German government action.
33. See GG art. 87a, § 2.
34. 90 BVerfGE 286 (1994). For a discussion of this decision, see QUINT, supra note 21,
at 290-96.
35. 90 BVerfGE at 344-55; see GG art. 24, § 2.
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and thus did not authorize unilateral military steps by the German
government alone.
But that was not the only startling new development advanced in
the opinion. Except in an immediate emergency-the Court continued-these military actions must be expressly approved in advance by
a vote of the Parliament.3 6 The requirement of an express parliamentary vote for military deployments appears nowhere in the Basic Lawnor is there any constitutional text that could be interpreted to require such a limitation.
But-for evident reasons of political philosophy in light of German history-the Constitutional Court thought that this was an essential safeguard and imposed it. Interestingly, and for reasons perhaps
related to the nature of a parliamentary system, there was no great
outcry at this newly imposed requirement. Indeed, new actions of the
generally preceded by the requisite
German military abroad are now
37
vote.
and
debate
parliamentary

These examples are just a few of the many decisions that testify to
the power and authority of the Constitutional Court in the German
governmental system. Overall, this exercise of a sort of sovereign prerogative has not damaged the popular status of the Court. Indeed,
the Court stands highest in popular esteem among the various organs
of the German government.
V.

A DIFFERENT

PERSPECTIVE

Thus, in light of its broad jurisdiction and the doctrinal reach of
its judgments, the German Constitutional Court seems to be exercising a breadth of judicial authority that goes significantly beyond that
of the Supreme Court of the United States. Yet that is a result that
arises from the comparison of doctrine against doctrine. In contrast,
when we view the comparison from a rather different perspective, the
36. 90 BVerfGE at 381-90.
37. For an illuminating assessment of this decision see Josef Isensee, Bundesverfassungsgericht-quo vadis?, 1996JuRISTENZEITUNG 1085.

Isensee writes:

When German foreign policy was hopelessly trapped in its self-made net of constitutional arguments... the Constitutional Court freed it and gave it back its flexiWhen called upon to help in a time of need, the Court filled the
bility ....
evident constitutional 'gap' and imposed a nontextual requirement of parliamentary approval-in a move that even the process of constitutional amendment
could not have performed more effectively. It was truly Solomonic wisdomwhich should not be subjected later to legalistic quibbling.
Id. at 1088 (translation by author).
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result of this balance does not seem quite so clear. For the German
Constitutional Court, though quite sweeping and even adventurous in
its doctrine, is sometimes capable of considerable caution in issuing
orders that actually require major changes in governmental or social
structures. Indeed, with respect to the practical impact on political
and social institutions that results from its judgments, the actual effect
of the decisions of the German Constitutional Court may still fall
short of the impact of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in important areas.
Of course the German Constitutional Court has handed down decisions that have had important political and social implications. In a
significant early decision, for example, the German Court confronted
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and annulled his plans for a national
television network, thereby setting the general framework for a decentralized (and presumably less politicized) television system that has
continued up to the present. 8 At a somewhat later point, the Court
invalidated sweeping plans of Willy Brandt and Social Democratic
state governments to reform the nineteenth-century structure of Germany's public universities; accordingly, that traditional system was
granted a new lease of life.39 The Constitutional Court also invalidated plans for a nationwide census, on the grounds that certain of its
provisions invaded the privacy of those being canvassed.4 ° More generally, the Court's willingness to extend constitutional review to regulatory matters, noted above, has required a continuing readjustment
of statutory programs in various areas of economic and social life.41
Yet none of these important decisions, nor indeed any other decisions of the Constitutional Court, seem to approach, in the magnitude
of their social or political impact, the decisions of the American Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education42 (and subsequent cases)

38. 12 BVerfGE 205 (1961); see also WESEL, supra note 31, at 120-27.
39. 35 BVerfGE 79 (1973). Moreover, the Court continues to exercise strict constitutional scrutiny over certain university functions, such as the admission of students. CURRIE,
supra note 22, at 303-04.
40. 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983).
41. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Moreover, as noted above, the Constitutional Court has issued important decisions relating to taxation. For example, the Court
invalidated a significant property tax (Vermgenssteuer), finding that the tax violated rights
of equality, and it has decreed that a certain minimum amount of family income must
remain free of taxation. 93 BVerfGE 121 (1995); see also supra note 22 and accompanying
text. Because these decisions removed or reduced important sources of governmental income, considerable legislative shuffling seems to have been necessary to make up the
shortfall or otherwise accommodate these decisions. See WESEL, supra note 31, at 362-66.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65:152

and in the reapportionment decisions of Baker v. Carrt4 and Reynolds
v. Sims.44 The Brown decision eventually initiated a great social revolution-not only in education, but also in many other areas of American
society; and the Reynolds case effected great political and social
changes by decreasing the electoral power of rural areas and increasing the influence of the cities and the suburbs across the nation.
Moreover, in the 1960s, the American Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Warren reformed the law of criminal procedure and police
practice, in constitutional cases that-for a number of reasons-have
no real parallel in Germany.45
The German Abortion decision of 197546 did indeed curtail to
some extent an enacted legislative liberalization of abortion. Yet exceptions to the Court's restrictive doctrine-within the opinion of the
case itself-significantly diminished the actual social impact of this
ruling. Indeed, it seems pretty clear that the American case of Roe v.
Wade47-by suddenly opening up a broad right to abortion where none
had previously existed (except in a handful of states)-created a
much greater social and institutional change within the United States
than the German abortion decisions did within Germany.
In some well-known instances, moreover, the German Constitutional Court seems to have gone out of its way to avoid confrontation
with the government even though it clearly had serious constitutional
doubts about the measures at issue. Thus in three of the most important cases in its history, the Court ultimately upheld the government's
action, but sought to limit its support through narrow interpretation
or monitory rhetoric. In 1973, the Court upheld the "Basic Treaty"
with East Germany-the capstone of Willy Brandt's policy of accommodation with the East-although the Court insisted on a narrow interpretation of the treaty that would avoid the appearance of

43. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
44. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
45. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Many important decisions on criminal procedure in Germany have involved statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court for criminal matters (BundesgerichtshoJ), rather
than interpretation of the Basic Law by the Constitutional Court. See generally STEPHEN C.
THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CASEBOOK APPROACH (2002); but see, e.g.,
Konrad Zweigert, Duktus der Rechtsprechungdes ersten Senats des Bundesverfassungsgerichtsund
einige Erinnerungen an seine Anfangszeit, in DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 1951-1971, at
111-12 (1971) (noting early criminal procedure cases in the German Constitutional
Court); infra note 52. Overall, however, these German decisions do not seem to have had
the social or political impact of the criminal procedure cases of the United States Supreme
Court.
46. 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975).
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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complete recognition of the East German state in international law.48
More recently, the Court upheld the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, which opened the way for the introduction of the euro
in Germany, but made it clear that further alienations of "sovereignty"
to the Union would be subjected to the strictest scrutiny.4 9 A similar
opinion was handed down at the beginning of Chancellor Kohl's tenure of office when the Court approved a highly questionable dissolution of Parliament that was engineered by the Chancellor in order to
achieve an early election. The Court upheld this maneuver, but it also
indicated that the action had approached the outer boundary of con50

stitutional permissibility.
It is also worth noting that although the German Court has
clearly proclaimed that jt has the authority to strike down constitu-

tional amendments if they are inconsistent with certain fundamental
characteristics of the Basic Law,5 1 the Court has never actually exercised this authority. In a recent decision, for example, the Court gave
a very narrow interpretation to a constitutional amendment, which authorized electronic eavesdropping in serious criminal cases, for the
purpose of saving the amendment from invalidity.5 2 The Court's reluctance may be contrasted with the record of the Supreme Court of
India which claims a similar authority and which has actually struck
down constitutional amendments on this basis.5 3
In the area of national security, it is often claimed that German
constitutional law contains no "political question" doctrine, which
would withdraw certain areas of inquiry from scrutiny of the German
48. 36 BVerfGE 1 (1973).
49. 89 BVerfGE 155 (1993).
50. 62 BVerfGE 1 (1983). In the summer of 2005, the Court reaffirmed this decision
when it upheld a similar questionable dissolution of Parliament by Chancellor Gerhard
Schr6der. BVerfGE, Decision of 25 August 2005, 2 ByE 4/05.
In some respects the acquiescence of the German Court in these important election
cases might be contrasted with the dramatic intervention of the United States Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam), in which the Court cut off the
possibility of further recounts in Florida, a state that was essential for George Bush's electoral college majority in the 2000 presidential election. The decision in Bush v. Gorecertainly
represented an extraordinary assertion of judicial power-although whether the decision
actually changed the result of the election is considerably less clear.
51. 30 BVerfGE 1 (1970); see GG art. 79, § 3.
52. 109 BVerfGE 275 (2004) ("grosser Lauschangriff'). The Court, however, did invalidate several related provisions of "ordinary" law in a decision that vigorously protected
rights of privacy. See WESEL, supra note 31, at 344-48. For possible American parallels, see
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.

297 (1972).
53. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) S.C.R. Supp. 1; Raju Ramachandran,

The Supreme Court and the Basic StructureDoctrine, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS
HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 107-33 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000).
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Constitutional Court.5 4 Yet, as a practical matter, the Constitutional
Court has been extremely cautious in the exercise of any actual power
relating to national security. Indeed-notwithstanding scholarly disclaimers-the Constitutional Court did adopt a form of "political
question" doctrine in upholding the deployment of Pershing I missiles in Germany during the Cold War,5 5 and also in a slightly later
case in which the Court refused to interfere with the stationing of
NATO chemical weapons in Germany.56 A noted German political
scientist has also detected the "equivalent" of a "political question"
doctrine in certain other areas-in a decision that refused to interfere
with government regulation of nuclear power plants and in the parliamentary dissolution case of 1983, mentioned above.5 7
As noted, the German Constitutional Court did impose a requirement of parliamentary approval for the deployment of German troops
outside of the NATO zone in certain cases. As a matter of doctrine,
this decision is breathtaking. But from the point of view of its practical impact, it is actually not quite so dramatic. In order to remain in
power in a parliamentary system, any German chancellor must also
control a parliamentary majority. It seems clear, as a result, that the
requirement of parliamentary approval for the executive's stationing
of troops abroad would ordinarily not have a major impact-because
any chancellor possessing the parliamentary support to remain in office would ordinarily also have majority parliamentary support for his
or her desired stationing of troops. Thus the requirement of parliamentary approval would have a serious impact only in exceptional
cases-for example, when the chancellor holds a precariously thin
parliamentary majority or when coalition partners disagree on the use
58
of troops and are willing to see the coalition break up over the issue.
In any event, there is nothing in the German jurisprudence like
the great American case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,5 9 in
See CURRIE, supra note 22, at 170-71 (commenting on these claims).
66 BVerfGE 39 (1983).
77 BVerfGE 170 (1987).
See Klaus von Beyme, The Genesis of ConstitutionalReview in ParliamentarySystems, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 35 (Christine
Landfried ed., 1988); 49 BVerfGE 89 (1978) (Kalkar nuclear power plant); supra note 50
and accompanying text.
58. Unsurprisingly, in later cases the Court has upheld government actions, relating to
NATO military policies and missions, against constitutional attack. See 104 BVerfGE 151
(2001) (finding that the government's adherence to a significant change in NATO's "Strategic Concept" does not require parliamentary approval as a new treaty); 100 BVerfGE 266
(1999) (dismissing, essentially for lack of standing, claims that German participation in
NATO air attacks against Serbia in 1999 violated international law).
59. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
54.
55.
56.
57.
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which the Supreme Court struck down the seizure of steel mills by the
executive branch-a measure that the President considered essential
for the effective conduct of an ongoing (albeit undeclared) war in
Korea. In the national security area, in fact, the German Court has
rarely actually ordered the government to do, or not to do, a specific
thing. Thus, there is also no German case that parallels the recent
decision of the Israeli Supreme Court, requiring the government to
change the route of the "security wall" being erected there. Nor does
there seem to be any case like the recent Hamdi decision in the
United States Supreme Court, in which the American military was required to provide a hearing before a "neutral decisionmaker" on the
question of whether a U.S. citizen, accused of fighting with the
Taliban, was actually an "enemy combatant."6 ° Yet in the summer of
2005, the German Constitutional Court invalidated a statute enforcing
a European Union rule that called for expedited extradition of a criminal suspect to another European Union country.6 1 As this case involved an alleged terrorist, the decision may herald greater
intervention by the German Court in national security matters.
Thus, overall, from the point of view of jurisdiction and doctrine,
the authority of the Constitutional Court of Germany seems to extend
significantly beyond that of the Supreme Court of the United States.
On the other hand, with respect to its willingness to effect actual
changes in social and political institutions, the Supreme Court of the
United States may still have played the greater role. Thus, with respect to the extent of doctrinal authority, the German Court may now
have a better claim than the United States Supreme Court to be the
"most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever
known." But from the point of view of actual impact on political and
social institutions, the Supreme Court of the United States may still
justify Alexander Bickel's resounding claim of power made more than
forty years ago.

60. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Moreover, a companion case in the Supreme Court may require such hearings for noncitizens held at Guantanamo Bay, as well.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d
443 (D.D.C. 2005) (interpreting Rasul and Hamdi to require such hearings for noncitizens
held at Guantanamo). See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (denying military
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens in certain circumstances); ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (1866) (same). But see Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e),
119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42 (2005) (purporting to withdraw jurisdiction of federal courts to
consider habeas corpus and certain other relief for detainees at Guantanamo Bay).
61. BVerfGE, Decision of 18 July 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04.
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ROOTS OF JUDICIAL POWER

But whether the recognition as "the most powerful court" should
go to the United States Supreme Court or to the Constitutional Court
of the Federal Republic of Germany-or indeed to one of the other
eminent constitutional courts around the world, such as those of

Hungary, South Africa, or India, whose stature and authority have
greatly increased in recent years 62 -it

is clear that the German and

the American tribunals are among those that have played the greatest
roles in the development of their respective political systems. A full
examination of the reasons for this extraordinary power-verging, in
some areas, on a form of hegemony-could take us far afield into an
examination of history, society, and culture, and at the end we probably would still not know the answer with any assurance. Yet there are

two important factors-with interesting parallels in Germany and the
United States-that must surely play some role. The first is the extraordinary ubiquity of law in the development of both societies. With
respect to the United States, it is common to acknowledge the
profound role played by law and lawyers in influential political controversies of seventeenth-century England and in the development of

American politics and society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Germany, one cannot fail to be impressed by the centuries-old

tradition of Roman law in the German universities, and the extraordinary role of law in the construction of the Prussian Rechtsstaat, as well
as the prominence of nineteenth-century debates over the desirability
of codification and the eventual adoption of the German Civil Code
(BGB). Against this deeply legalistic background, the lawlessness of
the Nazi state becomes even more striking.
But, beyond this, I would say that the cases of the United States
and Germany suggest that there is another crucial factor that has supported the authority of these two constitutional courts in recent
times-and that is the powerful historical showing that electoral democracy has not avoided serious forms of tyranny, oppression, or

other abuse. These historical lessons have shown that some form of
additional-not exactly majoritarian-moral control is essential. For
various reasons-including the lack of a better forum-the exercise of
this essential moral authority has fallen to the courts.
62. Indeed as far back as 1980, the writer Rajeev Dhavan called the Indian Supreme
Court "the most powerful court in the world," and another commentator claims that India
possesses "the world's most active judiciary." CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 72
& n.5 (1998) (citing RAJEEV DHAVAN, JUSTICE ON TRIAL (1980) and Carl Baar, Social Action
Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of the World's Most Active Judiciary, in COMPARATIVEJUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY (Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992)).
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In the German case, of course, this point seems undeniable. As
noted above, the German Basic Law and the German Constitutional
Court are responses to the unparalleled tyranny of the Nazi regime-a
regime that could be viewed as having come to power through the
failure of majoritarian democratic institutions. Indeed, it could well
be argued that Hider and the Nazi Party assumed office through the
democratic forms of the Weimar Constitution, and it seems most
likely that Hitler's tyranny enjoyed majority popular support in Germany until the end.
Thus, the placement of the Basic Rights at the beginning of the
German Basic Law-as well as other constitutional devices, such as
substantive limitations on constitutional amendments-were intended
to make clear that certain values are so important that they may not
be altered or impaired even by the strongest majoritarian vote. The
German Constitutional Court was the institutional embodiment of
that view. Although it may have taken some time, this position is now
thoroughly endorsed by the German population and electorate itself.
Thus, although now only very few of the Court's decisions can be
viewed as preserving the political community from anything that even
vaguely portends actual tyranny, it seems clear that the political and
moral foundation of the German Constitutional Court as a bulwark
against the catastrophes of the past still works strongly to ensure its
special authority and power today.
I believe that the extraordinary contemporary power of the American Supreme Court stems-at least in some part-from a similar basis.
An institution in American history that might be viewed as resembling
the European Holocaust of the 1930s and 1940s was the institution of
slavery which existed for centuries in the United States, concentrated
in the southern American states but supported by the national government, including the courts. This institution was officially expunged
through Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. Yet, in
the aftermath of slavery, numerous American states continued to support a system of hierarchy and oppression, reinforced through the institution of racial segregation. Naturally, the state legislatures, and
indeed Congress, possessed the authority to abolish this system, but
the American electoral structure-including the widespread disenfranchisement of black citizens in the South-seemed to have made
electoral change impossible.
For many decades (with a few enlightened exceptions) the judiciary also seemed unwilling to enforce the clear commands of the postCivil War constitutional amendments. Instead, the Supreme Court
showed great vigor in enforcing its view of property rights and related
constitutional provisions by invalidating certain measures of business
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regulation that favored workers or consumers. But by 1937, this line
of cases had also been disavowed by the Supreme Court. If, therefore,
one viewed the future of American constitutional law in 1940, one
might well have foreseen a long period of relative judicial inactivity.6 3
But this prediction, of course, would have proven false, and it was
the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education in
1954-declaring segregation in the public schools unconstitutionalthat really opened the door to extraordinary forms of judicial activism
and the exercise of heightened authority by the Supreme Court in the
decades that followed. This decision ultimately resulted in a great restructuring of social relations by the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts, as well as by the political branches. It also evoked reactions by the southern states that called for vigorous judicial action in
order to protect freedom of speech and association-essential for the
carrying out of desegregation and the dismantling of other raciallybased hierarchies-in related cases, such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6 4 NAACP v. Alabama,65 and NAACP v. Button.6 6 At the same time,
the Supreme Court seemed to develop sensitivity to other forms of
oppression, often indirectly involving racial discrimination, in such areas as criminal procedure 7 and family law 68-also areas in which the
electoral system seemed slow to act. Indeed, the great Reapportionment Cases of the early 1960s 6 9-which fundamentally shifted political power in the United States-also responded to what was seen as a
deep-seated injustice that could not be cured electorally because of
the gridlock of the political system.
Although the American Supreme Court has shifted its political
focus substantially since the great cases of the 1950s and 1960s, I think
that the present activism of the Court-in whatever direction it may
venture-rests on the foundation of judicial self-confidence which, after the crisis of the New Deal period, was reestablished in Brown v.
Board of Education. It was that case, along with related cases of the
Warren Court, that reminded American observers, also, that the electoral system-while the fundamental basis of any democracy-is not
enough and that a powerful moral oversight must be exercised by the
constitutional judiciary.
63. See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 121 (4th ed., revised by Sanford Levinson 2005).
64. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
65. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
67. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
69. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

